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Abstract 
This paper uses a difference-in-difference style estimation strategy to test separately the impact of 
competition from public sector and private sector hospitals on the efficiency of public hospitals. Our 
identification strategy takes advantage of the phased introduction of a recent set of substantive 
reforms introduced in the English NHS from 2006 onwards. These reforms forced public sector health 
care providers to compete with other public hospitals and eventually to face competition from existing 
private sector providers for care delivered to publicly funded patients. In this study, we measure 
efficiency using hospitals’ average length of stay (LOS) for patients undergoing elective surgery. For 
a more nuanced assessment of efficiency, we break LOS down into its two key components: the time 
from patients’ admission to the hospital until their surgery and the time from their surgery until their 
discharge. Here, pre-surgery LOS serves as a proxy for hospitals’ lean efficiency. Our results suggest 
that competition between public providers prompted public hospitals to improve their productivity by 
decreasing their pre-surgery, overall and post-surgery length of stay. In contrast, competition from 
private hospitals did not spur public providers to improve their performance and instead left 
incumbent public providers with a more costly case mix of patients and led to increases in post-
surgical LOS. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There has been vigorous debate over the theoretical justification and empirical support for 
expanding competition between health care providers.
1
  Nevertheless, despite the ambiguous 
evidence on the effect of hospital competition on providers’ quality and efficiency, a number 
of countries have recently enacted market-based reforms designed to create financial 
incentives for health care providers to improve their performance (Gaynor and Town, 2011).
2
  
In addition to expanding competition between large public hospitals, several of these 
countries have also promoted the entry of focused, privately owned specialty hospitals to 
encourage even more competition.
3
   This begs two key questions.  First, does increased 
competition between public hospitals prompt providers to improve their productive 
efficiency?  Second,  if some competition between large public hospitals is desirable, is 
adding more competition from private specialist hospitals even better? To answer these 
questions, this paper examines the impact of a recent set of substantive market-based reforms 
in the English National Health Service (NHS) that expanded patient choice and forced public 
hospitals to compete against one another from 2006 onwards and later allowed private sector 
providers to enter the market and compete to deliver care to NHS-funded patients.   
 
In what follows, we create a quasi-natural experiment using difference-in-difference 
regression to examine whether hospitals located in more potentially competitive elective care 
markets showed greater improvements in efficiency after patient choice and provider 
competition were introduced in 2006.  Our difference-in-difference research design and our 
access to detailed patient-level data allows us to expand on the previous research on hospital 
competition and obtain causal estimates on the effect of public sector competition on 
providers’ efficiency (Angrist and Pischke, 2010).  Likewise, the phased introduction of these 
reforms in England also allows us to test separately whether the 2008 entrance of private 
sector providers into the market for NHS care also stimulated further improvements in 
                                                 
1
 For example, see a recent debate on competition in the NHS between Mays (2011) and 
Stevens (2011) that was printed in the British Medical Journal. 
2
 These have included market-based reforms in the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, and 
Australia. 
3
 For a discussion of the private market in England, see Cooperation and Competition Panel 
(2011).  The entrance of specialist hospitals has also been seen in the US, the Netherlands, 
Canada and Germany.   
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incumbent hospitals’ efficiency or instead if these private providers cherry-picked patients 
who were less expensive to treat.  
 
The existing literature assessing the impact of hospital competition on providers’ efficiency 
has been hindered by two distinct limitations.   The first is that most research in this area has 
had to assess the effect of competition by examining the relationship between hospitals’ 
efficiency and cross-sectional variation in hospital market concentration (Gaynor, 2006).  
However, as Kessler and McClellan (2000) have noted, hospital market concentration may be 
endogenous to hospital performance both in the cross section and over time.  Here, high 
quality providers may deter potential competitors from entering the market, making these 
markets appear less competitive.   
 
To overcome this issue, we benefit from two sources of exogenous variation in England that 
aid us in identifying the impact of public sector and private sector hospital competition on 
incumbent public hospitals’ efficiency.  First, we examine a policy change (the introduction 
of patient choice and hospital competition) that was introduced in England and that applied 
across the country.  However, we can exploit the fact that these reforms would not have had a 
universally strong impact across England and should have had a more pronounced effect in 
areas where the pre-reform market structure was less concentrated.  Second, we benefit from 
the fact that public and private hospital locations in England are historical artifacts and are 
therefore unrelated to hospital efficiency.  In sum, this research design allows us to determine 
whether hospitals located in less concentrated markets prior to the UK government’s market-
based reforms differentially improved their efficiency relative to hospitals located in more 
concentrated markets, after public competition was introduced in 2006 and private sector 
competition was introduced in 2008.   
 
The second limitation in the prior hospital competition literature is that in the absence of 
hospital cost data, many studies have sought to measure hospital efficiency using proxy 
measures like hospitals’ length of stay (LOS) for elective and emergency care (Fenn and 
Davies, 1990, Martin and Smith, 1996, Gaynor et al., 2010).  The underlying logic for this 
measure is that if hospitals can maintain quality and deliver care within a shorter period of 
time, this is evidence of improvements in efficiency.  However, rather than improving their 
efficiency, hospitals could shorten their overall LOS by skimping on quality and discharging 
patients ‘sicker and quicker’.  Likewise, because overall LOS is heavily dependent on patient 
3 
 
characteristics (which directly influence recovery time), hospitals could also appear to 
shorten their LOS by avoiding high risk patients and focusing their care on patients who are 
likely less costly to treat or alternatively discharging patients before it is clinically 
appropriate (Epstein et al., 1990, Martin and Smith, 1996, Sudell et al., 1991).  
 
To address these issues and differentiate between genuine productive efficiency gains and 
quality skimping, we disaggregate LOS into its two key component parts: 1) the time from 
the patient’s admission until surgery; and 2) the time from the patient’s surgery until 
discharge.  Here, pre-surgery LOS will be less biased by patient characteristics and will be 
largely determined by hospitals’ admissions and surgical theatre utilization policies. Indeed, 
according to the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement, pre-surgery LOS should be 
a strong proxy for efficiency that captures lean production (NHS Institute for Innovation and 
Improvement, 2006, NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement, 2008a).  In contrast, 
post-surgery LOS could be driven by skimping and may reflect variation in patients’ recovery 
time.  In addition, to assess whether our results are a function of efficiency gains or effort by 
hospitals to avoid certain patients, we test whether hospitals facing greater amounts of 
competition from the public and private sector avoided treating more potentially higher cost 
patients (i.e. older and less wealthy) after competition was introduced in 2006.  
 
Our analysis spans 2002 through 2010 and examines over 1.8 million patient observations.  
Ultimately, we find that competition between NHS providers from 2006 onwards was 
associated with reductions in patients’ pre-surgery, post-surgery and overall LOS.  In 
addition, we find no evidence that publicly funded NHS hospitals located in more 
competitive areas were cherry-picking patients who would tend to be less expensive to treat. 
Conversely, the introduction of private sector competition in 2008 was not associated with 
improvements in incumbent public hospitals’ efficiency.  Indeed, ceteris paribus, patients in 
public hospitals located in areas with more private providers tended to have higher LOS in 
2008, 2009 and 2010.  This latter finding seems to be consistent with evidence that private 
sector market entry left incumbent providers treating a more costly case mix of patients  who 
were older and less wealthy.  This finding highlights the crucial need for policy-makers to 
risk-adjust payments as they introduced competition in markets with regulated prices, 
particularly when there are both public and private providers with different objective 
functions.   
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This paper is structured as follows.  In section 2, we briefly examine the recent NHS market-
based reforms.  In section 3, we examine the existing literature in this area, outline our 
empirical strategy and present our hypothesis.  Section 4 includes more information on the 
data used in this analysis and outlines the measures of market structure we constructed for 
this analysis.  In section 5, we present our results.  In section 6, we discuss our findings and 
present our conclusions.   
 
 
2. The NHS Reforms 
 
The English NHS was founded in 1948 and is a tax-funded health system that is free at the 
point of use.  The primary care system in England is organized around general practitioners 
(GPs) who provide patients with referrals for secondary care.  Historically, secondary care 
was mainly delivered in government-owned NHS hospitals that were funded by annual 
budgets set by the Department of Health (Klein, 2006).  From 1992 to 2003, annual hospital 
budgets were phased out and the government separated the purchasers of care from the 
providers of care.  During this period, hospitals were paid using annual block contracts that 
were awarded by local purchasing bodies and negotiated on price, which stipulated that 
providers deliver care to fixed populations (often without minimum activity requirements)  
(Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998, Department of Health, 2011).  Crucially, during this period, 
patients had little choice over where they received care and they were generally referred by 
their GP to the hospital with whom their local purchasing body maintained a contract.   
 
In 2002, following the announcement of substantial increases in health care spending, the UK 
government launched a wave of substantial, market-based reforms to the NHS (Department 
of Health, 2002).  The reforms were introduced on a rolling basis from 2002 through 2008 
and were designed to give patients a choice over where they received care and to introduce 
competition between hospitals within a market with fixed prices (Department of Health, 
2004).  During this period, the government introduced a range of policies designed to foster a 
more competitive environment.  This included introducing a new fixed-price, prospective 
payment system, modeled on the Medicare prospective payment system from the United 
States (Department of Health, 2011).  This payment system, known as Payment by Results 
(PbR), paid hospitals a fee determined by the government, on the basis of patients’ diagnoses, 
with adjustments for local economic wage rates, hospital characteristics and some elements 
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of illness severity.  In addition, the government encouraged new private providers to enter the 
market and gave hospitals additional fiscal and managerial autonomy (including the ability to 
retain surpluses).  These pro-competition policies were set against a backdrop of regulatory 
reforms designed to guarantee minimum standards of hospital performance.  
The key element of the NHS reforms was to give patients a formal choice over where they 
received secondary care.  Together with a reimbursement system where money followed 
patients around the system, the introduction of choice created financial incentives for 
hospitals to compete for market share. Beginning in 2002, the government introduced choice 
pilot programs around the country and gave patients who were waiting for over a year for 
care (later lowered to nine months) the ability to go to an alternative provider with spare 
capacity.  On January 1, 2006, the government required that all NHS patients referred for 
elective care be offered a choice of four or more providers (Department of Health, 2009).  
This was the first point at which the new payment system and patient choice worked in 
tandem to create financial incentives for hospitals to attract patients.  We regard this as the 
‘policy-on’ date where public hospitals faced competition from other public providers in the 
context of a revenue system rewarding them for higher volume. 
 
The introduction of patient choice was accompanied by the development of a paperless 
hospital referral system that allowed patients and their GPs to book hospital appointments 
online or over the phone.  The main online interface for the referral system allowed patients 
and their referring physicians to search for nearby hospitals and included information on 
providers’ performance and information on average waiting times at each facility. 
 
Over time, policy-makers sought to allow patients to access care in the private sector in order 
to prompt public hospitals to compete with new private entrants.  This push for more private 
provision that is funded by the NHS began with a centrally run program to create privately 
managed, specialty surgical centers, know as Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs).  
These facilities were focused on elective care and were frequently co-located on the grounds 
of existing NHS facilities (Department of Health, 2005). However, the ISTC program was 
fraught with problems and by mid-2006, there were only 21 ISTCs established to deliver care 
to NHS patients (Department of Health, 2006), and the program was eventually heavily 
curtailed.   
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Following the limited ISTC program, the government launched a more ambitious push to 
allow private providers to deliver care to NHS funded patients.  This program allowed private 
providers in England who registered with the government quality regulator
4
 to provide care to 
NHS funded patients.  This meant that beginning on a limited basis in July 2007, and in full 
force from 2008 onwards, all of the 162 private hospitals in England offering elective 
secondary care with overnight beds were potentially accessible to NHS-funded patients at no 
charge, if the hospitals agreed to the be paid based using standard NHS tariffs (Cooperation 
and Competition Panel, 2011).  In addition, to facilitate referrals, these hospitals were 
included on the NHS ‘Choose and Book’ website and were eligible for paperless referrals 
from NHS GPs (Department of Health, 2008).  In England, the private hospitals account for 
only 6.5% of the total hospital beds in the country (Boyle, 2011). In general, these private 
hospitals are similar to private specialty hospitals in the US.  These private sector hospitals in 
England have, on average, fewer than 50 beds and are predominantly focused on delivering 
elective surgical care (Laing and Buisson, 2011).  Of note, unlike public NHS hospitals, these 
private facilities were allowed to refuse treatment to certain patients based on a set of 
exclusion criteria that were agreed to with the Department of Health’s commercial directorate 
(Mason et al., 2008).  Specifically, private facilities could refuse to offer care to patients 
whom the providers viewed as having medical conditions that were ‘a constant threat to life’ 
or had American Society of Anesthesiologist Scores (severity scores) of 3 or more.
5
 
 
 
3. Literature Review, Hypotheses and the Specification of Our Empirical 
Model 
 
Literature Review 
 
Three bodies of research that are informative about the likely response of NHS hospitals to 
the 2006 introduction of patient choice and provider competition and the 2008 entry of 
private sector hospitals into the market for NHS funded care.  The first body of research 
                                                 
4
 http://www.cqc.org.uk/ 
5
 ASA 1: Healthy patient with localized surgical pathology and no systemic disturbance; 
ASA 2: Patient with mild to moderate systemic disturbance (i.e. surgical pathology or other 
disease process); ASA 3: Patient with severe systemic disturbance from any cause; ASA 4: 
Patient with life threatening systemic disorder which severely limits activity; ASA 5: Gravely 
ill patient with little chance of survival. 
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centers on the impact of prospective fixed price payment on hospital behavior.  The second 
examines the impact of hospital competition on providers’ quality.  The third assesses the 
impact of new market entry, including from specialist hospitals, on incumbent hospitals’ 
quality and productivity. In what follows, we will briefly outline this literature and frame our 
hypotheses. 
 
In isolation, the new payment system in England should reduce length of stay.  The new 
hospital reimbursement system in England is a per-case, prospective payment system that 
resembles the US Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) introduced in 1983 (Frank 
and Lave, 1985, Lave and Frank, 1990, Manton et al., 1993).  Prospective payment should 
reduce patients’ LOS because under this type of payment system, a hospital’s net revenue per 
patient decreases with each additional day of care provided (Cutler, 1995).  Consistent with 
the theoretical literature, there is evidence from various countries that has found that the 
introduction of case-based, prospective payment systems has led to a reduction in LOS.  In 
the US, several studies, including Feder et al. (1987) and Guterman and Dobson (1986) have 
found that the introduction of PPS in the US reduced LOS by between 3% and 10%.  
Similarly, Feinglass and Holloway (1991) and Kahn et al. (1990) found that PPS led to a drop 
in LOS of over 10%.   Evidence on the introduction of prospective payments in Israel in the 
1990s mirrors US evidence.  Shmueli et al. (2002) found that prospective payment was 
associated with a significant reduction in LOS, but it did not lead to any statistically 
significant changes in mortality.  Likewise, after the Italian government introduced a DRG-
based financing system in 1995, Louis et al. (1999) observed that LOS dropped, with no 
adverse impact on mortality or readmission rates.
6
 
 
There is some evidence regarding the impact of the prospective payment system introduced 
in the English NHS from 2003 through 2005. In a recent study, Farrar et al. (2009) conducted 
a difference-in-difference analysis comparing various outcomes measures in Scotland and 
England from 2002 through 2006.  Unlike England, Scotland did not introduce a prospective 
funding system from 2003 through 2006.  Farrar et al. (2009) found that in England, under a 
fixed price payment system, LOS fell more quickly and the proportion of day cases rose 
relative to Scotland.  This is the backdrop against which we measure whether there was a 
differential effect of prospective payment on hospitals located in competitive markets. 
                                                 
6
 For a comprehensive review of the literature on the effect of prospective payment, see 
Cutler (1995) and Newhouse (2004) 
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There is evidence that, with respect to clinical quality, hospitals located in less concentrated 
markets behave differently than hospitals located in concentrated markets when they are 
exposed to competition (Cooper et al., 2011, Gaynor et al., 2010, Kessler and McClellan, 
2000).  A growing body of research looking at the impact of fixed price competition on 
clinical quality in the US and England suggests that in a market with fixed prices, 
competition catalyzes improvements in clinical performance (Gaynor and Town, 2011).  In a 
widely cited study examining the impact of market structure on quality, Kessler and 
McClellan (2000) looked at the impact of hospital competition in the US on acute myocardial 
(AMI) mortality for Medicare beneficiaries from 1985 to 1994.  They find that in the 1980s, 
the impact of competition was ambiguous, but in the 1990s, higher competition led to lower 
mortality.  Using related methodology, Kessler and Geppert (2005) found that competition 
was not only associated with improved outcomes in their Medicare population, but it also led 
to more intensive treatment for sicker patients and less intense treatment for healthier patients 
who needed less care.
7
 
 
In England, recent evidence examining the impact of the introduction of patient choice on 
clinical outcomes finds similar results.  Cooper et al. (2011), an extension of Cooper et al. 
(2010) use a modified difference-in-difference analysis to analyze mortality from heart 
attacks and find that hospitals located in competitive markets improved their mortality rates 
more quickly than hospitals located in less competitive markets after patient choice and 
hospital competition were introduced nationally in 2006.  In their study, the authors find that 
their results remain consistent across a number of different measures of market structure. 
Separate work by Gaynor et al. (2010) using a long difference approach also found that 
competition in the NHS in 2006 was associated with reductions in hospitals’ annual overall 
length of stay and reductions in AMI and overall hospital mortality without concurrent 
increases in spending.  Finally, Bloom et al. (2010) have investigated the effect of hospital 
competition on management performance of hospitals in the NHS.  Using political 
marginality as an instrument for competition, this study found that hospitals facing 
                                                 
7
 It is important to note that there have been some studies on the impact of fixed priced 
hospital competition, which have not found positive results.  Gowrisankaran and Town 
(2003) find that hospital competition for Medicare enrollees lowered quality.  However, they 
ascribe their findings to the level at which the administered prices were set.  Mukamel et al. 
(2001) find that hospital competition for Medicare prices has no significant effect.   
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competition tended to be better managed, which resulted in lower death rates and greater 
financial surplus.   
 
A related strand of research has examined whether entrants will create competitive pressure 
that will prompt incumbent hospitals to improve their performance.  Cutler et al. (2010) 
looked at this issue by examining the impact of a policy change in Pennsylvania that rolled 
back the use of hospital certificates-of-need regulation.  This had the effect of allowing more 
providers to enter the market for coronary artery bypass grafting.  The authors analyzed this 
set of reforms and found that quality improved in markets with a higher share of new market 
entrants (Cutler et al., 2010).  Barro et al. (2006) looked at the impact that new specialty 
hospitals were having on the costs of care in cardiac care markets in US.  Here, the authors 
found that markets with new entrants had lower rates of cost growth between 1996 and 1999 
(Barro et al., 2006). 
 
There is also some work that investigates whether the reforms in the NHS would lead to 
cherry-picking and risk selection.  Here, research suggests prospective fixed price payment 
systems can create incentives for providers to avoid treating patients whose costs would 
likely exceed the regulated reimbursement rate (Allen and Gertler, 1991, Ellis and McGuire, 
1986, Ellis, 1998b).  Indeed, Ellis and McGuire (1986) have found that the introduction of 
prospective payment in the US was associated with reductions in spending on the sickest 
patients and Newhouse (1989) found under prospective payment, hospitals tended to select 
against more costly patients.  Ellis (1998) suggested that this risk-selection under prospective 
payment will likely be more acute in more competitive markets.  The lone empirical work in 
this area is by Meltzer et al. (2002), who used discharge data from California from 1983 to 
1993 to examine the impact of competition on hospital costs for low and high cost hospital 
patients before and after the introduction of the Medicare fee for service payment system in 
the US.  Here, the authors found that there were greater reductions in spending for more 
costly patients in more competitive areas.  They viewed this finding as consistent with the 
theory that hospitals in more competitive markets under prospective payment would seek to 
avoid treating more expensive patients (Meltzer et al., 2002). 
 
Additional research has examined whether specialty hospitals (largely analogous to the 
private providers in England) have tended to attract younger, healthier or wealthier patients. 
In addition to assessing the impact of cardiac specialty hospitals on quality, Barro et al. 
10 
 
(2006) also examined whether these facilities attracted a relatively healthier patient 
population.  They found that following the entry of specialized providers into the market, 
these specialty hospitals attracted a healthier patient case mix, leaving the population in 
incumbent general hospitals with a sicker patient population (Barro et al., 2006). These 
findings are echoed by other analysis suggesting specialist hospitals tend to cherry-pick more 
profitable patients (Winter, 2003, Cram et al., 2005, Kc and Terwiesch, Forthcoming).  
Indeed, there is evidence from England that the first wave of private providers that were in 
England, known as ISTCs, tended to draw healthier patients for care (Chard et al., 2011, 
Mason et al., 2008).  
 
Hypotheses 
 
This paper builds on earlier research and examines the impact of public and private sector 
competition on incumbent public hospitals’ efficiency in England.  Theory suggests that the 
introduction of hospital competition and patient choice in 2006 and the entrance of private 
sector providers in 2008, both within a market with regulated prices, will prompt public 
hospitals to increase their efficiency (shorten their pre-surgery LOS) (Gaynor, 2006).  During 
our period of analysis, hospital LOS is falling across England.  Theory suggests that hospitals 
located in more competitive markets will produce even sharper declines in LOS after the 
government’s pro-competition reforms were introduced in 2006.  Here, changes in pre-
surgery LOS would be suggestive of improvements in hospitals’ lean production.    
 
We expect these reductions in LOS to stem from improvements in hospital management that 
are driven by competition.  We will be able to capture these improvements in management, 
driven by competition not only in reductions in overall LOS, but also in reductions in pre-
surgery LOS, which are a direct function of hospitals’ operating room and admissions 
procedures.  Likewise, beyond the effect of management on LOS, we also hypothesize that 
hospitals facing greater competition will take additional steps to shorten their LOS because it 
will 1) allow hospitals to lower their marginal costs per patient thereby generating larger 
surpluses and 2) it will allow hospitals to free up additional operating room capacity which 
they can use to treat additional patients in order to increase their revenue, free up space to 
business steal from competitors and maximize their market share, assuming marginal costs 
are less than marginal prices.   
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At the same time,, hospitals facing more substantial pressure to maintain surpluses may face 
incentives to select patients that they expect to be less costly to treat.  Indeed, such fears were 
expressed about the earlier experience with hospital competition in the NHS in the 1990s 
(Scheffler, 1989).  However, no evidence has shown that hospitals in the NHS engaged in 
cherry-picking, and we are doubtful that it will occur within the current market (Le Grand et 
al., 1998).  That is because it is unlikely that NHS facilities actually have the ability to refuse 
treatment to publicly funded patients, since regulators state that NHS hospitals must not 
refuse treatment and cannot cherry-pick particular patients.   
 
However, consistent with Ellis (1998) and Barro et al. (2006), it is also likely that the 
entrance of private sector facilities in 2008 will leave incumbent public hospitals facing more 
private competition with a more costly mix of patients.  This outcome is particularly likely 
because private providers in England are, in contrast to NHS providers, allowed to refuse 
care to certain patients, largely on clinical safety grounds.  Likewise, while all NHS providers 
face a theoretical incentive to avoid treating patients whose costs are likely to exceed their 
reimbursement rates, these incentives might be more substantial for private, for-profit 
facilities with different objective functions than NHS providers.  
 
Empirical Estimation Strategy 
 
Our empirical analysis is focused on using difference-in-difference (DD) regression to test 
whether patients in more competitive markets had observable changes in their LOS after 
hospital competition in the public sector was introduced in 2006 and after private sector 
providers were allowed to compete with NHS from providers from 2008 onwards.   As we 
described in Cooper et al. (2011), the NHS competition reforms that we are studying do not 
fit precisely within the traditional difference-in-difference framework.  That is because the 
pro-competition reforms were rolled out universally across England and, strictly speaking, 
there were no wholly treated and wholly untreated groups.  However, the intensity to which 
hospitals are exposed to the reforms will vary on the basis of hospitals’ pre-reform market 
structure.  We hypothesize that hospitals located in more concentrated markets pre-reform 
will be less exposed to pressure from competition post-reform, whereas hospitals located in 
less concentrated markets will face more competitive pressure after the reforms were 
introduced.  As a result, our identification strategy rests on testing whether patients receiving 
care at hospitals located in less concentrated markets pre-reform had more marked reductions 
12 
 
in their LOS after the pro-competition reforms were introduced. Therefore, our general 
empirical regression takes the form: 
 
1) losijkt =  +   pub_compj + 2  priv_compj + 3 Post2005t  +  3 Post2007t + xijkt 
+  (pub_compj  Post2005t ) +  (priv_compj  Post2007t ) + j + k + p + ijkt 
 
Here, 
ijktlos is the length of stay in the hospital of patient i, who was referred by GP k and 
received care in year t at public hospital j. Post2005t  is an indicator variable for whether 
patient i received care after December 31
st
, 2005 and Post2007t is an indicator variable for 
whether patient i received care after December 31
st
, 2007.  Our measures of market structure 
are pub_compj  and priv_compj, which measure public market structure and private market 
structure respectively.
8
  The impact of greater public sector competition post-2005 is captured 
by ;  captures the impact of greater private sector market structure post-2007. The term 
xijkt is optionally included and is a vector of patient characteristics that includes 5-year age 
band dummies, dummies for patients’ socio-economic quintile and a gender indicator.  In 
addition, we can include GP, hospital and procedure fixed  (j + k + p) to control for their 
time invariant differences.   
 
In this paper, our identifying assumption is that in the absence of the pro-competition 
reforms, patient outcomes in more competitive areas would have followed similar trends to 
outcomes that occurred in monopoly markets.  Later in this paper, we test this assumption 
empirically by looking at a non-parametric estimation of (1), where our public and private 
market structure measures are interacted with year dummies and the estimator includes 
individual, interacted year dummies.  Throughout this analysis, we estimate (1) using 
Ordinary Least Squares and cluster the standard errors in our estimates at the hospital level 
within years to allow for error correlation across patients treated at the same facilities.  
 
At its core this estimation strategy is dependent on how we identify hospitals’ pre-reform 
market structure.  As a result, to add robustness, as we discuss in more detail below, we 
identify pre-market structure using counts measured within several different market 
definitions to illustrate that our findings are consistent across all of our measures of market 
                                                 
8
 As we describe in Section 3, we measure hospital market structure for each GP k.  These 
GP-level measures of market structure are aggregated up to hospital level j.  
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structure.  These include markets that capture a fixed geographic area and markets that 
capture fixed populations.  In addition to measuring competition using hospital counts, we 
also create Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes (HHIs) of market concentration that are based on 
predicted patient flows based on models of patient choice that are a function of hospital 
characteristics, patient characteristics and distances between patients and hospitals.   
 
As we discussed earlier, one broad concern within this literature is that any observed 
measures of market structure are potentially endogenous to hospital performance. Here, for 
example, a high-performing hospital may appear to be operating in a less competitive market 
because it has been able to attract market-share from its competitors or even drive them out 
of the market.  Likewise, poorly performing providers may appear to be operating in more 
competitive markets because their lack of quality and efficiency has encouraged other 
competitors to enter the market and offer better services to patients at more reasonable prices.  
However, in England, NHS hospital locations in England are a historical artifact (Klein, 
2006). As a result, we view the location of these NHS facilities as exogenous to hospital 
performance and unaffected by the NHS reforms that were introduced in the 2000s.   
 
Similarly, nearly every private provider in England was founded prior to the expansion of 
NHS patient choice to private providers in 2008.  Indeed, 158 of 162 providers were in 
existence prior to 2006, 90% were in existence prior to 2000, 72% were in existence prior to 
1990 and the mean opening date for private hospitals available to patients in our analysis was 
1979.  As a result, we also view the location of private providers in England as exogenous to 
NHS hospitals’ performance.  Nevertheless, private providers did have a choice about 
whether or not, as an organization, they offered care to NHS patients.  As a result, within our 
analysis, if we used the count of private providers who actually chose to deliver care to NHS 
patients, there is a risk that this measure could be endogenous to local NHS performance.  
Here, for example, private providers could decide to only enter the market for NHS market 
when they perceived that their local NHS providers were inefficient or were offering a poor 
level of service.  As a result, we base our counts of private hospitals on the number of private 
providers that were operating in the NHS during this period that could have decided to offer 
care to NHS patients, as opposed to counting those that actually did offer care. 
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4. Data Sources and Our Measures of Hospital Market Structure 
 
This paper relies on patient-level Hospital Episodes Statistics (HES) data from 2002 through 
2010. This is a large administrative data set that records nearly every consultant episode 
delivered in the English NHS.
9
  This dataset includes a wide range of information on patients, 
providers and local area characteristics.  In addition, we also use data on the private sector in 
England that were obtained from Laing and Buisson, a private data holding company in the 
UK.
10
  This data include the name, location, and bed numbers for private providers and the 
dates that these facilities opened.  We limit our analysis to private providers who offer 
elective care and are eligible to provide care to NHS-funded patients.  We have used further 
micro data on population levels and population density across UK Middle Layer Super 
Output Areas that were obtained from the Office of National Statistics.
11
  These measures 
were used in the construction of our hospital competition measures.  All hospital and GP 
postcodes were matched to their geographical coordinates using the UK National Postcode 
Directory. 
 
In our analysis, we focus on elective hip replacements, knee replacements, hernia repairs and 
arthroscopies performed on patients between ages 18 and 80.
12
  We excluded any 
observations missing admissions or discharge dates and observations that were missing data 
on patient characteristics.  This represented less than 2% of our sample.  We also exclude 
observations with a LOS in the 99
th
 percentile of the distribution, so that our estimates are not 
influenced by extreme outlying data observations (i.e LOS of over 6 months). We focused on 
elective hip replacements, knee replacements, arthroscopies and hernia repairs in this analysis 
                                                 
9
 Each HES record is a consultant episode, which we then collapsed to spells (admissions).   
10
 http://www.laingbuisson.co.uk/ 
11
 MSOAs have a minimum population of approximately 5000 and a mean population.  For 
more information, see http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/geography/beginner-s-
guide/census/super-output-areas--soas-/index.html.   
12
 We defined hip replacements as procedures with an Office of Population, Census and 
Surveys Classification of Surgical Operations and Procedures 4
th
 Edition (OPCS 4) code of 
W37.1, W38.1 or W39.1.  We defined knee replacements as procedures with an Office of 
Population, Census and Surveys Classification of Surgical Operations and Procedures 4
th
 
Edition (OPCS 4) code of W40.1, W42.1, or W42.1.  We defined hernia repairs as procedures 
with an Office of Population, Census and Surveys Classification of Surgical Operations and 
Procedures 4
th
 Edition (OPCS 4) code of T20.1, T20.2 or T20.3.  We defined arthroscopies as 
procedures with an Office of Population, Census and Surveys Classification of Surgical 
Operations and Procedures 4
th
 Edition (OPCS 4) code of W82 through W89.   
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because they collectively account for a large share of public and private providers’ elective 
activity. 
 
Our dependent variable of interest is the LOS for patients admitted for an elective hip 
replacement, knee replacement, hernia repair or arthroscopy at an NHS acute hospital 
between 2002 and 2010.   As explained earlier, we divided patients’ length of stay in the 
hospital into two components, pre- and post-surgery LOS, and study the impact of 
competition on these two measures separately.    
 
Our patient-level data allow us to risk-adjust for clinical severity by controlling for various 
patient characteristics in our estimates. These patient characteristics include gender, age and 
socio-economic status measured using the income vector of the 2004 Index of Multiple 
Deprivations (IMD), measured at the Lower Super Output Area (Department of Communities 
and Local Government, 2009). 
 
For confidentiality reasons, the patients’ home addresses are not available for use in our 
analysis.  However, we do have access to codes that identify the patients’ GP and GP 
postcode.  There are approximately 8000 GPs in each year in our data. Patients can usually 
(at the time of our study) only register at a GP practice if they live in a GP’s catchment area, 
so a patient’s GP practice location serves as a good proxy for a patient’s home addresses.  As 
a result, we use the distance between a patient’s registered GP and their local hospitals as a 
proxy for the distance between a patient’s home address and their local hospitals. 
 
Quantifying Public and Private Hospital Competition 
 
To quantify public and private hospital market structure, we measure counts and HHIs within 
three separate market definitions (one market of a fixed geographic size and two market 
definitions based on a size that captures a fixed population).  In addition, we also calculate a 
HHI that is based on predicted patient flows.  The counts of hospitals within fixed radius 
markets are meant to capture the number of hospitals per unit of area.  The count of hospitals 
within the population-defined markets are meant to capture the number of hospitals per 
people.  Our measures of market based on patient flows are designed to capture market 
concentration based on predicted patient flows that are unrelated to patients actual referral 
decisions.   
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We calculate our counts and HHIs at the GP-practice level.  This is consistent with the 
structure of the NHS reforms, where all secondary referrals must flow through patients’ GPs 
and it also is consistent with evidence that shows that patients view GPs as their most 
important source of information on where to be referred (Dixon et al., 2010).  However, since 
hospitals likely cannot differentiate their services to patients from different GP practices, we 
aggregate these GP-level competition measures up to a hospital level.  
 
Details on our methodology for constructing our market definitions are as follows.  For our 
fixed radius markets, a radius r of 20km was drawn around each GP in England.  As a result, 
circular markets were drawn around each GP, which captured all providers within radius r 
that performed the particular elective procedure being studied. For our fixed population 
measures, we begin with a matrix of Middle Super Output Areas (MSOAs) in UK, which are 
predefined geographic areas in the UK that each capture between 5000 – 7000 people.  For 
each MSOA, we calculate the radius that extends from its center out to the distance that 
would be required to bound a circular area with a population of 333,000 adults over the age 
of 18, which we measure using data from the 2001 census.  We chose these population levels 
because 333,000 people is roughly the catchment area for each hospital in England, based on 
the ratio of the current population of adults over the age of 18 in England divided by the 
number of hospitals in the county.  In addition, we also calculate the radius for circular areas 
around each MSOA that would capture 666,000 people. Then, each general practice in 
England is assigned a radius, based on the MSOA where it is located.  As a result, for each 
GP in England, we get two radii; one that defines the area around that practice that captures 
333,000 adults and one that defines the area that captures 666,000 adults.  These radii serve 
as our market boundaries.  In practice, the mean radius defined by our 333,000-person radius 
is 14.8km and the radii at the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile of the distribution are 7.6km and 
20.1km, respectively. For our 666,000 person, market the mean radii that defines the market 
is 22.1km and the radii at the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile of the distribution are 11.7km and 
29.3km, respectively.    
 
After we have defined our market areas, we measure counts of providers within these fixed 
radius and fixed population markets.  The counts of public health care providers are based on 
the number of public providers that were offering care in 2002.   Our count of private 
providers is based on the number of providers who could have potentially offered care to 
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NHS patients in 2008, irrespective of whether or not they actually did offer care.  These 
providers were not ISTCs; they were hospitals included within the Any Willing Provider 
(AWP) program.  Within our sample, there are a small number of GP markets where the 
various population radii do not capture an NHS provider.  For those markets, we extend the 
radius out to a distance that captures the nearest NHS provider located outside of the market.   
 
In addition to creating counts of hospitals within GP-centered markets, we also created GP-
level HHIs using predicted patient flows, similar to Kessler and McClellan (2000).  Like 
Kessler and McClellan (2000), we also generated predicted patient flows based on 
differential distances, controlling for patient and provider characteristics. Here, we have 
multiplied our HHIs by -1, so that a higher HHI is associated with less concentration.  Details 
of how these predicted patient flow measures are calculated are included in Appendix 1 
 
Ultimately, we end up with counts and predicted-flow HHIs measured within over 8000 
separately defined markets in England that are each centered on GP practices. In order to get 
hospital-level measures of market structure, we aggregate our measures up to the hospital 
level j, weighted by the distance from GPs to hospitals for all GPs k within 60km of hospital 
j, such that:  
 
3)     . 
  
This aggregation creates hospital-level competition measures that are the average of the GP-
level demand functions.  Crucially, our distance weighting means that a hospital’s market 
structure will be more heavily influenced by the demand functions of its nearby GP markets. 
 
 
5. Results   
 
Our analysis included 1,882,750 patients who were treated at 161 public NHS hospitals and 
received referrals for care from 8,024 separate GP practices.  During the latter three and a 
half years of our analysis, there were 162 privately owned facilities that were potentially 
accessible to the NHS-funded patients in our sample.  From 2002 through 2010, LOS in 
England fell substantially.  Table 2 illustrates that during that period, overall LOS fell by 
32.4% and pre-surgery LOS fell by 77.6%.  Indeed, by 2010, patients were 41.7% more 
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likely to receive surgery on the day that they were admitted to the hospital than they were in 
2002.  These broad reductions in pre-surgery, post-surgery and overall LOS were likely the 
result of the government’s introduction of a fixed price prospective payment system (Farrar et 
al., 2009).  It is against this backdrop that we are carrying out our analysis to determine 
whether hospitals located in less concentrated markets pre-reform had more substantial 
reductions in LOS post-2006, when public hospitals were forced to compete against one 
another, and post-2008, when incumbent public hospitals faced competition from the private 
sector.  Because we do not have data on patients treated in the private sector, our analysis 
focuses exclusively on the LOS of patients treated in public facilities during this period.  
 
Table 3 presents estimates of equation (1) on overall LOS and examines whether hospitals 
located in less concentrated public and private markets, based on the count of hospitals in 
those markets and predicted flow HHIs, improved their performance after these pro-
competition reforms were introduced.  Table 3 presents estimates of (1) across four measures 
of market structure, with and without hospital and GP fixed effects and patient 
characteristics.  A negative term on the interaction between public market structure and our 
post-2006 indicator suggests that hospitals in less concentrated (more competitive) markets 
pre-reform reduced their LOS after the NHS pro-competition reforms were introduced (recall 
that this is because we have multiplied our HHI by -1 so that it increases as concentration 
decreases).     
 
Across each specification, hospitals located in less concentrated markets pre-reform reduced 
their overall LOS from 2006 onwards, after they were exposed to the financial incentives 
created by the government’s market-based reforms.  To benchmark the magnitude of our 
effects, a one standard deviation decrease in market concentration pre-reform was associated 
with a reduction in overall LOS of between 2% and 6% relative to the mean LOS over that 
period.  Of note, a 1 standard deviation increase in our public count measured within a 
333,000-person radius produces approximately the same effect as a 1 standard deviation 
increase in our predicted HHI (i.e. more competitive and less concentrated).  Framed 
differently, the addition of one hospital to a hospital market lowered the LOS for patients 
treated in that area by approximately 0.4 days (or approximately 16.6% off of mean LOS 
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during our study period).  All our results are robust with and without GP and hospital fixed 
effects and with and without patient characteristics.
13  
 
 
While we observe that public sector competition reduces LOS post-2006, we find the 
opposite result from private sector competition.  From 2008 onwards, a 1 standard deviation 
lower pre-reform private sector market concentration is associated with 2-2.7% relative 
increase in the length of stay for patients treated at public hospitals.  This result is also robust 
across each of our measures of market structure and remains positive and significant with and 
without fixed effects and controls for patient characteristics.  As we will explore later, this 
finding is potentially suggestive that private providers are cherry-picking less costly patients 
away from public incumbent hospitals.   
 
Figure 1 presents the yearly impact of public hospitals’ market concentration on patient’s 
overall LOS, where market structure is measured using the count of NHS hospitals within our 
333,000 person markets.
14
  This figure is constructed from the coefficient estimates presented 
in Appendix 2.  These results demonstrate that the impact of hospital competition occurred 
after the period that these pro-competition reforms were introduced in 2006.  Figure 1 
validates our difference-in-difference strategy and illustrates that competition had virtually no 
effect on overall LOS prior to 2006.  In contrast, higher competition was associated with 
reductions in LOS from 2006 onwards.  Table 4 presents several tests of robustness for the 
results we presented in Table 3.  Results from Column 1 from Table 4 suggest that 
competition had a beneficial impact outside of London and that lower market concentration 
(higher competition) was associated with lower LOS when we excluded patients treated in 
London from our analysis.  Columns 2 and 3 test whether foundation trusts (high performing 
NHS hospitals) and teaching hospitals had differential improvements in LOS from 2006 
onwards.  Columns 2 and 3 demonstrate that even with these additional controls, our main 
results stay consistent with what we observed in Table 3.  These results are important to 
demonstrate because if foundation trusts and teaching hospitals were more likely to be 
located in less competitive markets and they were differentially impacted by other policy 
changes during this period, then they could be spuriously driving our results.  Column (5) 
tests whether the LOS for patients treated in public hospitals exposed to more competition 
from the government’s initial attempts to expand the supply of private providers were 
                                                 
13
 All of our results are also robust when run at the hospital level using robust standard errors. 
14
 Results for the year * competition interactions are presented in Appendix 2.   
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impacted by the reforms.  These results suggest that the impact of this minor wave of hospital 
entry mirrored the trends we observed from 2008 onwards.  These results are consistent with 
existing evidence that suggests that these independent sector treatment centers tended to draw 
a healthier case mix of patients in comparison to traditional tertiary hospitals (Chard et al., 
2011).   
 
While we consistently observe that patients treated in public facilities facing more 
competition from 2006 onwards had shorter overall LOS, our earlier discussion observed that 
we are aware that these results could be a function of changes in hospitals’ policies that result 
in patients getting discharged from the hospital ‘sicker and quicker’.  To address these 
concerns and get a more nuanced assessment of the impact of competition on patients’ LOS, 
Table 5 presents estimates of (1) on patients’ pre-surgery and post-surgery LOS.  Note that 
improvements in pre-surgery LOS cannot be a function of hospital discharge policies.  
Instead, they likely reflect improvements in hospitals’ admissions policies and operating 
room management, which reduce the turn around time between patients (NHS Institute for 
Innovation and Improvement, 2008a).  Table 5 illustrates that hospitals located in less 
concentrated (more competitive) markets achieved more pronounced decreases in both 
patients’ pre-surgery LOS and post-surgery LOS after hospital competition was introduced in 
2006.  Indeed, the relative impact of competition was actually greater on pre-surgery LOS 
than post-surgery LOS.   
 
Our results suggest that a 1 standard deviation decrease in concentration pre-reform was 
associated with a 3-9% relative reduction in pre-surgery LOS, relative to the mean, after the 
reforms were introduced.  These findings suggest that the hospital competition resulted in 
reductions in patients’ LOS that were driven by genuine improvements in lean production, 
rather than changes in hospitals’ discharge policies that sent patients home before it was 
clinically appropriate.  Tables 6 and 7 suggest that these results hold across a number of tests 
of robustness, and Figure 2 illustrates that the improvements we see in pre-surgery largely 
occurred after hospitals were forced to compete from 2006 onwards.  
 
The Department of Health in the UK has estimated that each excess bed day for an elective 
admission in the NHS costs the health service approximately £225.00 (NHS Institute for 
Innovation and Improvement, 2008b).  As a result, reductions in LOS should produce 
substantial monetary savings for the health service.  Table 6 suggests that hospitals located in 
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a 1 standard deviation less concentrated market prior to 2006 reduced their pre-surgery LOS 
by 9.9% from 2006 onwards.  However, since pre-surgery LOS is generally quite short, this 
reduction amounted to approximately a one-hour reduction in pre-surgery LOS for each 
patient.  Therefore, it is unclear whether these reductions in LOS resulted in fewer total bed 
days spent in the hospital.  In order to determine whether reductions in pre-surgery LOS 
resulted in less bed days in the NHS, Table 8 presents estimates of (1) on whether or not 
patients underwent surgery on the day they were admitted to the hospital.  Here, results from 
Table 8 suggest that hospitals more exposed to public sector competition increased the rate 
that patients treated in their facilities had surgery on the day that they were admitted to the 
hospital.  Estimates from Table 8 suggest that a one standard deviation reduction in market 
concentration pre-reform was associated with a 2-4% increase in the rate that patients had 
surgery on the day of their admission.  
 
Evidence of Public and Private Sector Competition Altering the Case Mix of Patients 
Receiving Care at Public Facilities 
 
As we have discussed, there is reason to suspect that hospital competition together with 
prospective payment could create incentives for providers to avoid treating patients who are 
potentially more costly to treat.  This could influence our results in two key ways.  First, if 
public providers engaged in cherry picking, this could undermine our argument that hospital 
competition between public providers induced improvements in efficiency from 2006 
onwards.  Second, if private providers engaged in cherry-picking, this could help explain why 
the 2008 entrance of private sector providers into the market for NHS funded care was 
associated with increasing LOS in hospitals located in areas with more private providers.   
 
To test whether public or providers cherry-picked healthier patients for care post-reform, we 
run estimates of (1) where we place patient characteristics on the left-hand side of our 
estimation.  This allows us to observe whether higher public and private sector competition 
was associated with changes in the case-mix of patients treated in public hospitals from 2006 
onwards.   
 
Table 9 presents estimates of the effect of public and private hospital market structure on the 
age of patients at incumbent facilities.  Two clear results emerge.  First, public hospitals 
located in less concentrated (more competitive) markets pre-reform did not have a 
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statistically significant change in the age of their patients post reform.  This suggests that they 
did not avoid treating older patients.  In contrast, there is some evidence that NHS hospitals 
located in areas with a more robust private sector tended to treat older patients post reform.  
We take this as indicative of risk-selection.  
 
Building on these results, Table 9 presents estimates of (1) where we observe whether pre-
reform market structure was associated with changes in the socio-economic status of patients 
treated in public hospitals post-reform.  Results from Table 9 illustrate that hospitals located 
in less concentrated markets post-reform tended to treat older patients.  This suggests that the 
reductions in LOS that we previously observed were a function of improvements in hospital 
efficiency, rather than risk-selection.  In contrast, consistent with our results from Table 9, 
results from our estimates of (1) on patients’ socio-economic status suggest that hospitals 
located in areas with more private providers tended to treat a less wealthy mix of patients 
after private sector competitors entered the market for NHS care from 2008 onwards.  Taken 
as a whole, results from Tables 9 and 10 suggest that private sector competition from 2008 
onwards failed to stimulate efficiency gains in the public sector because they left public 
providers treating a more costly mix of patients.   
 
 
6. Discussion and Concluding Thoughts 
 
Over the last decade, policy-makers in England have introduced a series of reforms to the 
NHS that were designed to use patient choice and provider competition in an effort to create 
financial incentives for public sector health care providers to improve their performance 
(Department of Health, 2004).  These efforts are consistent with the increasing use of market-
based reforms in public services, like health care and education, across the developed world 
(Hoxby, 2000; Cutler, 2002).   
 
Thus far, evidence suggests that the impact of this set of reforms in the English NHS 
improved clinical quality.  Several studies have found that, consistent with theory, the 
introduction of fixed price hospital competition has lowered hospital mortality rates and 
shortened hospitals’ overall length of stay (Cooper et al., 2011, Gaynor et al., 2010).  
However, there is little evidence on whether these reforms have led to efficiency gains and 
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little analysis of the impact that private providers have had on the performance of incumbent 
public hospitals.  Likewise, outside of England, the evidence of the impact of competition on 
providers’ efficiency remains murky, and there is little firm evidence on whether or not 
competition induces hospitals to avoid treating potentially more costly patients (Ellis, 1998a, 
Meltzer et al., 2002).   
 
This paper seeks to fill this evidence gap.  In this study, we utilize patient-level data from the 
English NHS to not only examine the impact of public and private sector performance on 
public hospitals’ productive efficiency, but to also examine whether the combination of the 
new prospective payment system together with public and private sector competition led 
providers in England to avoid treating patients who might have higher than average costs. 
 
From an empiricists’ perspective, the recent policy reforms in the English NHS provide an 
ideal environment to test the impact of public sector and private sector competition on 
incumbent hospitals’ performance.  First, unlike the case of hospitals in the US, the location 
of public and private hospitals in England is an historical artifact.  As a result, this allows us 
to develop measures of market structure that are unrelated to performance.  Second, recent 
reforms in the NHS have been introduced universally across the country.  This allows us to 
avoid concerns that the policies we are studying were endogenous to regional pre-reform 
trends in hospital performance.  Third, the phased introduction of the reforms in England (i.e. 
public competition in 2006; private competition in 2008) means that we can identify 
separately the effect of public sector versus private sector competition on incumbent NHS 
hospitals.  Finally, our data provides an outcome variable – patients’ pre-surgical length of 
stay – that was noted by the NHS  Innovation Institute to capture hospitals’ lean production 
(NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement, 2008a, NHS Institute for Innovation and 
Improvement, 2008b). 
 
The results from our analysis suggest that competition between public sector hospitals from 
2006 onwards led to moderate but statistically significant reductions in pre-surgery, post-
surgery and overall LOS.  We estimate that hospitals located in markets that were 1 standard 
deviation less concentrated pre-reform shortened their pre-surgery LOS by approximately 9% 
and their overall LOS by 5% relative to the mean from 2006 onwards over and above the 
downward tend in LOS present during this period.  These reforms also raised the rate that that 
patients received care on the day the entered their hospital by approximately 4%.  Our 
24 
 
estimates were robust across a number of specifications and measures of competition.  There 
was no evidence that these reforms induced public hospitals to discharge patients ‘sicker and 
quicker’ and no evidence that they spurred public hospitals to avoid treating older and less 
wealthy patients.  To the contrary, as public competition in the NHS took force, NHS 
hospitals facing more competition also tended to treat patient populations that had a higher 
share of less wealthy patients.  
 
While the impact of competition between public sector firms led to clear productivity gains, 
the policy of opening up NHS markets to private sector competition did not.  Incumbent NHS 
providers located in more competitive hospital markets actually saw their LOS increase after 
competition with the private sector took force from 2008 onwards. Our result suggests that 
private sector market entrants may have attracted a healthier patient population and left 
incumbent public hospitals with a patient case mix that is more costly to treat.  Consistent 
with this assertion, further evidence from our work suggests that incumbent hospitals in more 
competitive private markets saw the average age and proportion of poorer patients in their 
case mix increase after competition took force in 2008. 
 
It is unclear from our analysis whether or not private sector providers actively avoided 
treating less costly patients or whether these results stem from healthier and younger patients 
choosing to receive care in the private sector.  Nevertheless, our results do suggest that more 
attention needs to be paid in England to suitably risk-adjusting payments for both public and 
private sector providers. Elsewhere, Barro et al. (2006) found that while privately owned 
specialty hospitals tended to draw healthier patients away from incumbent general hospitals, 
the entrance of these facilities still led to a net reduction in overall spending in these markets.  
Seemingly this was because the entrance of these new providers induced broader productivity 
gains that led to market-wide improvements in efficiency that swamped any losses from 
cream skimming.  This certainly could still be the case in the NHS, but given that we failed to 
see that private sector competition led to reductions in pre-surgery LOS for incumbent public 
hospitals, this assertion cannot be asserted empirically. 
 
The conclusion then is twofold.  First, our findings demonstrate that hospital competition can 
lead to improvements in public providers’ productivity based on our observed reductions in 
hospitals pre-surgical LOS.  Here, if we assume that the impact of competition on pre-surgery 
LOS captured overall improvements in hospital efficiency, then these 7-9% gains would have 
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produced non-trivial savings.  However, we also find that the underlying market dynamics 
and the specifics of the hospital payment program in place can greatly affect the impact of 
competition.  While we did find that competition improved providers’ productivity, we also 
found that that there is a real risk that hospital competition between public and private 
providers and between general hospitals and specialty surgical centers can lead to risk 
segmentation, with large incumbent hospitals at risk of inheriting a riskier patient case mix 
who are more costly to treat.  This, in and of itself, may not reduce social welfare. However, 
our results suggests that in order to maximize the welfare gains from these types of market-
based reforms, policy-makers must investigate and introduce more sophisticated risk-
adjustment of hospital payments to control for variation in patients’ prospective costs and 
limit hospitals’ ability to create excess profits by focusing on healthier patients. 
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Figure 1: Changes in overall LOS for patients treated in public hospitals located in 
monopoly markets (dashed line) and overall LOS for patients treated in hospitals that 
face competition from an alternative provider (solid line).   
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Notes: the plot is normalized to zero in 2006 
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Figure 2: Changes in pre-surgery LOS for patients treated in public hospitals located in 
monopoly markets (dashed line) and overall LOS for patients treated in hospitals that 
face competition from an alternative provider (solid line). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for key variables 
 Mean S.D. Min Max 
Pre-Surgery LOS 0.244 0.513 0.000 7.000 
Same-Day Surgery  0.778 0.4153 0.000 1.000 
Post-Surgery LOS 2.179 3.1628 0.000 17.000 
Overall LOS 2.411 3.430 0.000 17.000 
Count of public providers within 333k population 
radius 
1.230 0.3763 1.000 3.371 
Count of private providers within 333k population 
radius 
1.110 0.3598 0.126 2.586 
Count of public providers within 666k population 
radius 
2.192 0.3980 1.344 3.445 
Count of private providers within 666kk population 
radius 
2.121 0.6110 1.068 4.866 
Count of public providers within 20km fixed radius 5.866 5.94 1.000 20.373 
Count of private providers within 20km fixed radius 5.525 5.81 0.016 20.505 
Predicted HHI -0.524 0.1560 -0.970 -0.311 
Income Vector of the 2004 Index of Multiple 
Deprivations 
0.135 0.1080 0.000 0.960 
Female 0.388 0.4872 0.000 1.000 
Age 56.076 15.6398 18.000 79.000 
Hospital located in urban area 0.772 0.4193 0.000 1.000 
Hospital located in London 0.122 0.3271 0.000 1.000 
Foundation Trust Status 0.248 0.4321 0.000 1.000 
Teaching Status 0.119 0.3238 0.000 1.000 
 
 
 
Table 2: Yearly means of pre-surgery LOS, the same-day surgery rate, post-surgery 
LOS and overall LOS 
 Pre-Surgery 
LOS 
Same-Day 
Surgery Rate 
Post-Surgery 
LOS 
Overall 
LOS 
2002 0.376 0.6543 2.605 2.981 
2003 0.373 0.6563 2.501 2.874 
2004 0.355 0.6733 2.400 2.755 
2005 0.321 0.7064 2.261 2.582 
2006 0.273 0.7510 2.154 2.427 
2007 0.200 0.8162 2.038 2.238 
2008 0.144 0.8696 1.927 2.070 
2009 0.115 0.8952 1.970 2.086 
2010 0.084 0.9273 1.930 2.014 
     
Percentage change from 
2002 - 2010 
-77.66% 41.72% -25.91% -32.44% 
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Table 3: Least-Squared Estimates of (1) on Patients’ Overall Length of Stay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Post 2005 -0.131 
(0.152) 
-0.150 
(0.152) 
-0.144 
(0.117) 
-0.353*** 
(0.101) 
-0.594*** 
(0.029) 
-0.948*** 
(0.068) 
       
Post 2007 -0.431*** 
(0.073) 
-0.442*** 
(0.074) 
-0.429*** 
(0.055) 
-0.481*** 
(0.066) 
-0.326*** 
(0.028) 
-0.348*** 
(0.027) 
       
Public 
Comp 
0.405*** 
(0.085) 
0.367*** 
(0.084) 
- - - - 
       
Private 
Comp 
-0.067+ 
(0.037) 
-0.057 
(0.037) 
- - - - 
       
Post 2005 * 
Pub. Comp 
-0.389** 
(0.120) 
-0.394** 
(0.120) 
-0.396*** 
(0.093) 
-0.127** 
(0.044) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.604*** 
(0.122) 
       
Post 2007 *  
Priv. Comp 
0.154** 
(0.060) 
0.158** 
(0.060) 
0.153*** 
(0.043) 
 0.105*** 
(0.029) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
       
       
Patient 
Char. 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital 
F.E. 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Public 
Comp 
Measure 
Count 
within 333 
population 
market 
Count within 
333 
population 
market 
Count 
within 333 
population 
market 
Count within 
666 
population 
market 
Count within 
20km Fixed 
Predicted 
Flow HHI 
Private 
Comp 
Measure 
Count 
within 333 
population 
market 
Count within 
333 
population 
market 
Count 
within 333 
population 
market 
Count within 
666 
population 
market 
Count within 
20km Fixed 
Count 
within 
20km Fixed 
       
Obs 1882750 1882750 1882750 1882750 1882750 1882750 
R-Squared 0.738 0.749 0.756 0.756 0.756 0.756 
       
Notes: Dependent variable is patient’s overall length of stay. Patient characteristics include 
five-year age band dummies, dummies for the quintile of the income vector of the 2004 index 
of multiple deprivations and an indicator for patient gender.  The estimates also include day 
of week and month time dummies.  Standard errors are clustered around hospitals within 
years. + p < 0.10 *, p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <  0.001 
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Table 4: Tests of the robustness of least squared estimates of (1) on overall LOS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef.  
S.E. 
Post 2005 -1.650*** 
(0.230) 
-0.152 
(0.118) 
-0.150 
(0.119) 
-0.160 
(0.118) 
-0.193 
(0.120) 
      
Post 2007 -0.406*** 
(0.062) 
-0.432*** 
(0.055) 
-0.434*** 
(0.055) 
-0.429*** 
(0.055) 
-0.445*** 
(0.055) 
      
Public Comp - - - - - 
      
Private Comp - - - - - 
      
Post 2005 * Pub. 
Comp 
-1.115*** 
(0.250) 
-0.395*** 
(0.093) 
-0.387*** 
(0.096) 
-0.389*** 
(0.093) 
-0.384*** 
(0.094) 
      
Post 2007 *  Priv. 
Comp 
0.123* 
(0.052) 
0.154*** 
(0.043) 
0.158*** 
(0.044) 
0.154*** 
(0.043) 
0.169*** 
(0.044) 
      
      
Patient Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Hospital F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Procedure F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes  
      
Excluding 
London 
Yes     
FT Status * Post 
2005 
 0.021 
(0.029) 
   
Teaching 
Indicator * Post 
2005 
  -0.041 
(0.055) 
  
Big Hospital 
Indicator * 2006 
   0.020 
(0.029) 
 
Count of ISTCs * 
Post 2005 
    0.177* 
(0.078) 
      
Public Comp 
Measure 
Count within 333 
population market 
Count within 333 
population market 
Count within 
333 
population 
market 
Count 
within 333 
population 
market 
Count within 
333 
population 
market 
Private Comp 
Measure 
Count beds within 
333 population 
market 
Count beds within 
333 population 
market 
Count beds 
within 333 
population 
market 
Count beds 
within 333 
population 
market 
Count beds 
within 333 
population 
market 
      
Obs 1653425 1882750 1882750 1882750 1882750 
R-Squared 0.758 0.756 0.756 0.756 0.756 
      
Notes: Dependent variable is patient’s overall length of stay. Patient characteristics include five-year age band 
dummies, dummies for the quintile of the income vector of the 2004 index of multiple deprivations and an 
indicator for patient gender.  The estimates also include day of week and month time dummies.  Standard errors 
are clustered around hospitals within years. + p < 0.10 *, p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <  0.001 
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Table 5: Least-squared estimates of (1) on pre- and post-surgery length of stay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pre-
Surgery 
Post-
Surgery 
Pre-
Surgery 
Post-
Surgery 
Pre-
Surgery 
Post-
Surgery 
Pre-
Surgery 
Post-
Surgery 
 Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Post 2005 -0.045 
(0.035) 
-0.099 
(0.097) 
-0.098*** 
(0.027) 
-0.652*** 
(0.082) 
-0.128*** 
(0.010) 
-0.466*** 
(0.024) 
-0.217*** 
(0.021) 
-0.731*** 
(0.059) 
         
Post 2007 -0.112*** 
(0.017) 
-0.317*** 
(0.046) 
-0.147*** 
(0.019) 
-0.317*** 
(0.055) 
-0.109*** 
(0.010) 
-0.218*** 
(0.023) 
-0.103*** 
(0.009) 
-0.245*** 
(0.022) 
         
Public 
Comp 
- - - - - - - - 
         
Private 
Comp 
- - - - - - - - 
         
Post 2005 
* Pub. 
Comp 
-0.085** 
(0.028) 
-0.311*** 
(0.077) 
-0.024* 
(0.012) 
-0.291* 
(0.140) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.128*** 
(0.037) 
-0.476*** 
(0.107) 
         
Post 2007 
*  Priv. 
Comp 
0.020 
(0.013) 
0.134*** 
(0.037) 
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
0.070** 
(0.024) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
         
Patient 
Char. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital 
F.E. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Procedure 
F.E. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Public 
Comp 
Measure 
Count 
within 
333k pop 
market 
Count 
within 
333k pop 
market 
Count 
within 
666k pop 
market 
Count 
within 
666k pop 
market 
Count 
within 
20km 
Fixed 
Count 
within 
20km 
Fixed 
Predicted 
Flow HHI 
Predicted 
Flow HHI 
Private 
Comp 
Measure 
Count 
within 
333k pop 
market 
Count 
within 
333k pop 
market 
Count 
within 
666k pop 
market 
Count 
within 
666k pop 
market 
Count 
within 
20km 
Fixed 
Count 
within 
20km 
Fixed 
Count 
within 
20km 
Fixed 
Count 
within 
20km 
Fixed 
         
Obs 1882750 1882750 1882750 1882750 1882750 1882750 1882750 1882750 
R-
Squared 
0.340 0.747 0.340 0.747 0.340 0.747 0.340 0.747 
         
Notes: Dependent variables are patients’ pre-surgery and post-surgery length of stay. Patient 
characteristics include five-year age band dummies, dummies for the quintile of the income 
vector of the 2004 index of multiple deprivations and an indicator for patient gender.  The 
estimates also include day of week and month time dummies.  Standard errors are clustered 
around hospitals within years. + p < 0.10 *, p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <  0.001 
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Table 6: Tests of the robustness of least squared estimates of (1) on pre-surgery LOS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Post 2005 -0.049 
(0.037) 
-0.039 
(0.035) 
-0.050 
(0.035) 
-0.051 
(0.035) 
-0.058 
(0.035) 
      
Post 2007 -0.113*** 
(0.019) 
-0.109*** 
(0.017) 
-0.117*** 
(0.017) 
-0.112*** 
(0.017) 
-0.116*** 
(0.017) 
      
Public Comp - - - - - 
      
Private Comp - - - - - 
      
Post 2005 * Pub. 
Comp 
-0.081** 
(0.030) 
-0.086** 
(0.028) 
-0.077** 
(0.029) 
-0.083** 
(0.028) 
-0.082** 
(0.028) 
      
Post 2007 *  
Privy. Comp 
0.018 
(0.015) 
0.019 
(0.013) 
0.024+ 
(0.013) 
0.020 
(0.013) 
0.023+ 
(0.013) 
      
      
Patient Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Procedure F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Excluding 
London 
Yes     
FT Status * Post 
2005 
 -0.016+ 
(0.009) 
   
Teaching 
Indicator * Post 
2005 
  -0.039* 
(0.016) 
  
Big Hospital 
Indicator * 2006 
   0.008 
(0.009) 
 
Count of ISTCs * 
Post 2005 
    0.046+ 
(0.024) 
      
Public Comp 
Measure 
Count within 333 
population market 
Count within 333 
population market 
Count within 
333 
population 
market 
Count within 
333 
population 
market 
Count within 
333 
population 
market 
Private Comp 
Measure 
Count beds within 
333 population 
market 
Count beds within 
333 population 
market 
Count beds 
within 333 
population 
market 
Count beds 
within 333 
population 
market 
Count beds 
within 333 
population 
market 
      
Obs 1653425 1882750 1882750 1882750 1882750 
R-Squared 0.353 0.340 0.340 0.340 0.340 
      
Notes: Dependent variable is patient’s overall length of stay. Patient characteristics include five-year age band 
dummies, dummies for the quintile of the income vector of the 2004 index of multiple deprivations and an 
indicator for patient gender.  The estimates also include day of week and month time dummies.  Standard errors 
are clustered around hospitals within years. + p < 0.10 *, p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <  0.001 
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Table 7: Tests of the robustness of least squared estimates of (1) on post-surgery LOS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Post 2005 -1.650*** 
(0.230) 
-0.113 
(0.097) 
-0.100 
(0.098) 
-0.109 
(0.098) 
-0.136 
(0.100) 
      
Post 2007 -0.406*** 
(0.062) 
-0.323*** 
(0.046) 
-0.317*** 
(0.047) 
-0.317*** 
(0.046) 
-0.329*** 
(0.047) 
      
Public Comp - - - - - 
      
Private Comp - - - - - 
      
Post 2005 * Pub. 
Comp 
-1.115*** 
(0.250) 
-0.309*** 
(0.077) 
-0.310*** 
(0.079) 
-0.307*** 
(0.077) 
-0.302*** 
(0.077) 
      
Post 2007 *  Priv. 
Comp 
0.123* 
(0.052) 
0.136*** 
(0.037) 
0.134*** 
(0.037) 
0.134*** 
(0.037) 
0.145*** 
(0.038) 
      
      
Patient Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Procedure F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Excluding 
London 
Yes        
FT Status * Post 
2005 
  0.037 
(0.023) 
    
Teaching 
Indicator * Post 
2005 
  
-0.002 
(0.043) 
  
Big Hospital 
Indicator * 2006 
   0.013 
(0.024)  
Count of ISTCs * 
Post 2005 
   
 
0.131* 
(0.065) 
      
Public Comp 
Measure 
Count within 333 
population market 
Count within 
333 population 
market 
Count within 333 
population 
market 
Count within 
333 
population 
market 
Count within 
333 
population 
market 
Private Comp 
Measure 
Count beds within 
333 population 
market 
Count beds 
within 333 
population 
market 
Count beds 
within 333 
population 
market 
Count beds 
within 333 
population 
market 
Count beds 
within 333 
population 
market 
      
Obs 1653425 1882750 1882750 1882750 1882750 
R-Squared 0.758 0.747 0.747 0.747 0.747 
      
Notes: Dependent variable is patient’s overall length of stay. Patient characteristics include five-year age band 
dummies, dummies for the quintile of the income vector of the 2004 index of multiple deprivations and an 
indicator for patient gender.  The estimates also include day of week and month time dummies.  Standard errors 
are clustered around hospitals within years. + p < 0.10 *, p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <  0.001 
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Table 8: Least squared estimates of (1) on whether or not patients had surgery on the 
day that they were admitted to the hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Post 2005 0.048 
(0.033) 
0.097*** 
(0.026) 
0.120*** 
(0.009) 
0.196*** 
(0.020) 
     
Post 2007 0.106*** 
(0.016) 
0.142*** 
(0.018) 
0.105*** 
(0.010) 
0.098*** 
(0.009) 
     
Public Comp - - - - 
     
Private Comp - - - - 
     
Post 2005 * 
Pub. Comp 
0.076** 
(0.027) 
0.020+ 
(0.011) 
0.004** 
(0.001) 
0.106** 
(0.035) 
     
Post 2007 *  
Priv. Comp 
-0.017 
(0.012) 
-0.026*** 
(0.007) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
     
     
Patient Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Procedure F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Public Comp 
Measure 
Count within 333k 
pop market 
Count within 666k 
pop market 
Count within 20km 
Fixed 
Predicted Flow HHI 
Private Comp 
Measure 
Count within 333k 
pop market 
Count within 666k 
pop market 
Count within 20km 
Fixed 
Count within 20km 
Fixed 
     
Obs 1882750 1882750 1882750 1882750 
R-Squared 0.373 0.373 0.373 0.373 
     
Notes: Dependent variable is whether or not patients had surgery on the day that they were 
admitted for care. Patient characteristics include five-year age band dummies, dummies for 
the quintile of the income vector of the 2004 index of multiple deprivations and an indicator 
for patient gender.  The estimates also include day of week and month time dummies.  
Standard errors are clustered around hospitals within years. + p < 0.10 *, p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01, *** p <  0.001 
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Table 9: Least squared estimates of (1) on the age of patients at incumbent public 
hospitals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Post 2005 0.972*** 
(0.192) 
0.957*** 
(0.159) 
0.746*** 
(0.059) 
0.653*** 
(0.121) 
     
Post 2007 0.011 
(0.101) 
-0.142 
(0.110) 
-0.015 
(0.059) 
-0.005 
(0.055) 
     
Public Comp - - - - 
     
Private Comp - - - - 
     
Post 2005 * Pub. Comp -0.207 
(0.151) 
-0.109 
(0.069) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.124 
(0.209) 
     
Post 2007 *  Priv. Comp 0.051 
(0.085) 
0.099* 
(0.048) 
0.015* 
(0.007) 
0.013* 
(0.006) 
     
     
Patient Char. Yes 
(excluding 
age) 
Yes 
(excluding 
age) 
Yes 
(excluding 
age) 
Yes (excluding 
age) 
Hospital F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Procedure F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Public Comp Measure Count within 
333k pop 
market 
Count within 
666k pop market 
Count within 
20km Fixed 
Predicted Flow 
HHI 
Private Comp Measure Count within 
333k pop 
market 
Count within 
666k pop market 
Count within 
20km Fixed 
Count within 
20km Fixed 
     
Obs 1882750 1882750 1882750 1882750 
R-Squared 0.339 0.339 0.339 0.339 
     
Notes: Dependent variable is the age of patients at public facilities. Patient characteristics 
include five-year age band dummies, dummies for the quintile of the income vector of the 
2004 index of multiple deprivations and an indicator for patient gender.  The estimates also 
include day of week and month time dummies.  Standard errors are clustered around hospitals 
within years. + p < 0.10 *, p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <  0.001 
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Table 10: Least squared estimates of (1) on the social-economic status of patients at 
incumbent public hospitals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Post 2005 0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.010*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
     
Post 2007 0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.002** 
(0.000) 
     
Public Comp - - - - 
     
Private Comp - - - - 
     
Post 2005 * Pub. Comp 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.0005*** 
(0.00005) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
     
Post 2007 *  Priv. Comp 0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.0002** 
(0.00006) 
0.0005*** 
(0.00006) 
     
     
Patient Char. Yes 
(excluding 
age) 
Yes 
(excluding 
age) 
Yes 
(excluding 
age) 
Yes 
(excluding 
age) 
Hospital F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Procedure F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Public Comp Measure Count within 
333k pop 
market 
Count within 
666k pop market 
Count within 
20km Fixed 
Predicted Flow 
HHI 
Private Comp Measure Count within 
333k pop 
market 
Count within 
666k pop market 
Count within 
20km Fixed 
Count within 
20km Fixed 
     
Obs 1878273 1878273 1878273 1878273 
R-Squared 0.427 0.427 0.427 0.428 
     
Notes: Dependent variable is the socio-economic status of patients at public facilities 
measured using the income vector of the 2004 Index of Multiple Deprivations. Patient 
characteristics include five-year age band dummies, dummies for the quintile of the income 
vector of the 2004 index of multiple deprivations and an indicator for patient gender.  The 
estimates also include day of week and month time dummies.  Standard errors are clustered 
around hospitals within years. + p < 0.10 *, p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <  0.001 
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Appendix 1: Calculated Predicted Patient Flow HHIs 
 
Our HHIs based on predicted patient flows were calculated as follows.  First, take patient i 
who was registered at GP k and received a hip replacement at hospital j in 2002.  We 
assumed that each hospital located within 100km of GP k was a potential option if it 
performed at least 20 hip replacements per year.  Then, we modeled the patient i’s choice as a 
function of i’s characteristics, i’s GP k’s characteristics, the characteristics of the hospitals 
within 100km of k and the differential distances from k to those hospitals.  
 
To do this, we aggregated our data up to the GP level. Here, we computed the average 
characteristics of all patients referred from k for a hip replacement in 2002.  At the GP level, 
we know the actual frequency that k refers patients to hospital j.  Thus, we generated a 
Poisson regression where the dependent variable was the count of patients referred by GP k to 
hospital j, controlling for the average socio-economic status for hip replacement patients in 
GP practice k, k’s annual number of hip replacement referrals, the average age of hip 
replacement patients at k, the average level of morbidity of hip replacement patients k, and 
the gender distribution at k.  Here, socio-economic status was measured using the income 
vector of the 2004 index of multiple deprivations and morbidity was measured using the 
Charlson index of comorbidity.  
 
Consistent with previous work that predicted patient flows, we do not include either patient 
characteristics or hospital characteristics on their own.  Instead, they are all entered interacted 
with the distance from GP to the nearest hospitals within 100km.  In addition, similar to 
Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Gaynor et al. (2010), we did not include hospital fixed 
effects 
 
The underlying Poisson regression we used was akin to the conditional logit used in Kessler 
and McClellan (2000) and generated predicted counts of the number of patients GP k would 
refer to hospital j.  In our Poisson, we assumed that groups of individuals i represented by 
their GP k’s would gain indirect utility *kjU , from choosing hospital j based on the sum of a 
function V(.), defined by interactions of the relative distances of the potential choices and 
hospital characteristics demographic characteristics and GP referral patterns, and a factor, kj  
representing unobservable heterogeneity of individuals, GPs and hospitals as it influence 
choice.   
 
Thus  
 
Here, McFadden (1973) shows that through specifying the distribution of all residual factors, 
kj, and assuming these to be independently and identically distributed according to the 
extreme value distribution, the probability of patient i registered at GP k choosing hospital j, 
kj, can be expressed as a function of all relevant characteristics and parameters estimates, 
constrained to be the same for all alternatives associated with these characteristics through 
application of a (conditional) logistic function such that: 
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The parameter estimates can be returned through maximizing the log-likelihood function: 
 
 
 
i.e. through estimation of the conditional logit model. Again, to make the computations 
easier, we built off of the main findings from Guimaraes et al. (2003) who show that because 
of the equivalent relationship between likelihood function of the conditional logit and the 
Poisson regression, we can use the Poisson regression model to return the same parameter 
estimates.    
 
Ultimately, our Poisson model explains approximately 50% of the variation in GP referrals 
and can be written in log form as:  
 
 
where Ckj are the counts of individuals i registered at GP k who are referred for care at 
hospital j, and X is a matrix of independent variables that includes distance interacted with 
the type of hospital (e.g. whether FT or private), hospital activity levels, patient 
characteristics averaged across GP practices (gender, socio-economic status and level of co-
morbidities), and the annual number of GP referrals per k.    
 
Following Kessler and McClellan (2000), we used these predicted counts (countkj) to 
generate market shares, denoted kj, for all hospitals j = 1…,j, located within 100km of k: 
 
. 
 
We then used these predicted market shares generated from the predicted count of patients 
referred from k to j to create GP-level HHIs.  These GP-level HHIs were the sum of the 
squares of the predicted market shares of providers within 100km of k: 
 
. 
 
This measure would be similar to our fixed radius HHIs centered on GP practices, except that 
the market shares used to create the HHIk would be based on predicted patient flows.  
Consistent with our other measures, we aggregated this measure up to hospital level based on 
a weighted average of all GP measures located within 60km of hospital j, where the weight is 
one divided by the distance from j to k.   
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Appendix 2: Least squared estimates of competition on pre-surgery, post-surgery and overall LOS where the 
public and private competition measures are interacted with year dummies.   
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Pre-Surgery LOS Post-Surgery LOS Overall LOS 
 Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
Coef. 
S.E. 
2003 post * Comp public -0.026 0.029 0.002 
 (0.058) (0.132) (0.150) 
2004 post * Comp public -0.034 0.061 0.027 
 (0.053) (0.127) (0.145) 
2005 post * Comp public -0.058 0.139 0.082 
 (0.051) (0.125) (0.145) 
2006 * Comp public -0.088+ 0.143 0.055 
 (0.051) (0.128) (0.147) 
2007 post * Comp public -0.117* -0.035 -0.152 
 (0.058) (0.131) (0.155) 
2008 post * Comp public -0.141* -0.278* -0.419** 
 (0.057) (0.135) (0.159) 
2009 * Comp public -0.142** -0.284* -0.425** 
 (0.053) (0.140) (0.161) 
2010 post * Comp public -0.116* -0.372* -0.488** 
 (0.056) (0.148) (0.173) 
2003 post * Comp private -0.007 0.044 0.036 
 (0.026) (0.083) (0.092) 
2004 post * Comp private -0.019 0.008 -0.011 
 (0.023) (0.073) (0.081) 
2005 post * Comp private -0.044+ -0.010 -0.054 
 (0.023) (0.071) (0.079) 
2006 post * Comp private -0.054* -0.018 -0.072 
 (0.025) (0.067) (0.078) 
2007 post * Comp private -0.050* 0.054 0.004 
 (0.025) (0.071) (0.083) 
2008 post * Comp private -0.025 0.111 0.086 
 (0.025) (0.073) (0.082) 
2009 post * Comp private -0.006 0.156* 0.150+ 
 (0.024) (0.076) (0.084) 
2010 post * Comp private -0.002 0.198* 0.195* 
 (0.025) (0.078) (0.088) 
    
Year Post Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Patient Controls Yes Yes Yes 
    
Public Comp Measure Count within 333k pop 
market 
Count within 333k pop 
market 
Count within 333k 
pop market 
Private Comp Measure Count within 333k pop 
market 
Count within 333k pop 
market 
Count within 333k 
pop market 
    
Obs 1882750 1882750 1882750 
R2 0.340 0.752 0.743 
    
Notes: Dependent variable is whether or not patients had surgery on the day that they were admitted for care. Patient 
characteristics include five-year age band dummies, dummies for the quintile of the income vector of the 2004 index 
of multiple deprivations and an indicator for patient gender.  The estimates also include day of week and month time 
dummies.  Standard errors are clustered around hospitals within years. + p < 0.10 *, p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <  
0.001 
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